INTRODUCTION

Ramsey Sentences
This paper returns to the topic of Ketland 2004 , which aimed to clarify the Newman objection to scientific structuralism. Several ways of formulating the propositional knowledge claims associated with scientific structuralism involve the appearance of a Ramsey sentence, in one form or another. Some structuralists "ramsify" the linguistic formulations of theories explicitly (e.g., Zahar 2001, Appendix), while others "ramsify" in a less obvious manner (e.g., the content of any "structural representation claim" seems to be a Ramsey sentence). However, there is a problem. In a 1928 review of Russell's structuralism, M.H.A. Newman pointed out that these "structural representation claims" reduce to cardinality claims. In 1985, Demopoulos and Friedman applied this criticism to argue that the truth of a theory's Ramsey sentence is equivalent to the theory's empirical adequacy plus a condition on the cardinality of the world. In particular, the "structural content" of a theory reduces to cardinality content. In Ketland 2004 , the main result obtained was that a Ramsey sentence ℜ(Θ) is true just if the theory Θ has an empirically correct full model with sufficiently many objects.
Thus, not much more than empirical adequacy is required for ℜ(Θ) to be true: so, structuralism collapses to anti-realism (cf., van Fraassen's constructive empiricism).
The notion of a Ramsey sentence first appears in Frank Ramsey's "Theories" (1929) , discussing the role of theoretical predicates (observational predicates are supposed, via a "dictionary" or "correspondence rules", to "interpret" the theoretical predicates). Consider a statement of the form Θ(T 1 ,…, T n ), with predicates T 1 ,…, T n occurring in Θ. The corresponding Ramsey sentence has the form:
(1) There are relations R 1 ,…, R n such that Θ(R 1 ,…, R n ).
Syntactically, the Ramsey sentence replaces the predicates T i with secondorder variables R i , and then prefixes the result with existential quantifiers for those variables. We say that the T i have been "ramsified".
1 In effect, (1) expresses that the condition Θ is satisfiable. More generally, a Ramsey sentence has the form:
Example 1. Consider Max Born. The following is true:
(3) Max Born is the grandfather of Olivia Newton John.
Applying second-order ∃-I to the predicate "grandfather", (3) implies:
(4) There is a relation R such that Max Born bears R to Olivia Newton John.
This is the Ramsey sentence of (3). Call it ℜ(3). There is a sense in which the truth of ℜ(3) is nearly trivial. More exactly, (5) ℜ(3) is true iff (3) is satisfiable on a domain containing Max and Olivia.
Example 2: Suppose L is a formalized language and Θ is an L-theory. Consider the claim, (6) The theory Θ has a model with domain D. This is equivalent to, (7) There are relations R 1 ,…, R n on D such that (D, R 1 ,…, R n ) ⊨ Θ. 1 "Ramsified" or "Ramseyfied"? As I understand the terminological use, the phrase "ramsified" is an allusion to Ramsey's discussion of Russell's ramified theory of types. Ramsey noted that the ramified theory of types is an unnecessary complication over the simple theory. And this observation has been expressed as a joke: "type theory needs ramsification, not ramification".
Thus, "Θ has a model" is, in effect, a Ramsey sentence.
Example 3. Suppose that M is a mathematical structure, as might crop up in the mathematical development of a scientific theory. For example, M might be the abstract 4-dimensional Minkowski spacetime, (R 4 , η ab ). Consider claims of the form:
Structural Representation Claims (8a) M "represents" the world.
(8b) M is "isomorphic" to the world. (8c) The world "exemplifies" M.
(8d) The world "instantiates" M.
It's unclear what this kind of claim means. One analysis of (8a)−(8d) seems to be the following:
So, (8a)−(8d) are, in effect, Ramsey sentences. Under this analysis, structural representation claims are Ramsey sentences. Example 4. Suppose that Tim is the set of temporal instants and Bef is the physical relation of time-ordering expressed, in English, by "t 1 is before t 2 ". Then a simple theory of time, Θ T , may be expressed by the statement:
One may "ramsify" Θ T as follows:
(11) There is a set X ⊆ the world and a relation S on X with (X, S) ≅ (R, < R ).
Example 5. Maxwell's equations for electromagnetism may be written as follows:
(12) For any spacetime point p, (∇⋅B)(p) = 0, and (∇⋅E)(p) = ρ(p), etc.
This is "ramsified" as follows:
(13) There exist vector fields X, Y, Z and a scalar field F, on spacetime such that, for any spacetime point p, (∇⋅X)(p) = 0, and (∇⋅Y)(p) = F(p), etc.
Structuralism
Throughout the 20 th century, versions of scientific structuralism have been proposed by many philosophers of science, including Russell, Carnap, (G.) Maxwell, Sneed, Zahar, Worrall, Stegmüller, Redhead, French, Ladyman and others. 2 Simplifying somewhat, one school of scientific structuralism (Maxwell 1970 , Worrall 1989 , Zahar 2001 advocates an epistemological view, embodied by a slogan along the lines of "all we can know of the external world is its structure". Zahar and Worrall relate their arguments back to Poincaré, and further back to Kant. These views are usually motivated by epistemological considerations about what we can come to know about the world. For Poincaré, Zahar and Worrall, these considerations involve theory change in science.
It is probably sensible to begin with the version of epistemological structuralism given by Russell (Russell 1919 (Russell , 1927 , who wished to analyse the relation of cognition to the external world. In modern terminology, Russell's idea is that a "phenomenal structure" of some sort is built up in the mind on the basis of perceptual experience. This contains the percepts arranged in a relational structure. The mind is directly acquainted with this structure. But we are, on Russell's view, not directly acquainted with external reality. In a sense, we know it only by "description". To cash this out, Russell suggested, again with modern terminology, that the relation of this phenomenal structure to the world is that it is "isomorphic" to the world. For example, let the phenomenal domain P be the set of auditory pitches {Do, Re, Mi, Fa, So, La, Ti}, familiar to readers who have seen The Sound of Music. Let the distinguished relation H be the perceptual relation "has higher pitch than". Then the structure (P, H) is the corresponding phenomenal structure. Russell's idea is that experience brings us into direct acquaintance with a phenomenal structure M phen . Then our scientific knowledge of the external world, in general, takes the following form:
(14a) The world W exemplifies (or: instantiates) M phen .
(14b) M phen represents (or: is isomorphic to) the world W.
These are "structural representation claims" whose obvious analysis is a Ramsey sentence, thus:
There is a connection between Russell's structuralism and a more recent position concerning the nature of theories, the "model-theoretic" conception of theories, which holds that a scientific theory is, or is to be "presented" as, a "class of mathematical structures" or a "class of models". The main problem with the model-theoretic conception of theories concerns its repudiation of semantics.
3 For, if a theory is a class of mathematical structures, it is extremely unclear what it means to say of a theory (a collection of structures) that it is true. There is no familiar sense in which structures are truth-bearers. In contrast, under ordinary Tarskian semantics, truth bearers are formulas of some interpreted language L. An interpreted language L may be construed as a pair (L, M), where L is an uninterpreted language, and M is an L-structure (or interpretation). Then truth of a formula ϕ in L is precisely defined in the usual way. I.e., ϕ is true in L iff M ⊨ ϕ. Alternatively, truth bearers may be taken to be propositions (e.g., those expressed by sentences in an interpreted language). Indeed, in my view, scientific theories simply are collections of propositions. But models and structures are not truth-bearers. 4 So, what does it mean to say of a structure (or model) that it is "true"? For example, given a class Σ of structures (e.g., the models of Peano arithmetic; the countable dense linear orderings without endpoints, etc.), what could the following mean:
(16) The class Σ of structures is true? Perhaps, (16) means something like:
(17) Some M ∈ Σ "represents" (or "is isomorphic to") the world. This is a "structural representation claim" again, whose meaning is, presumably:
Again, this is a Ramsey sentence. So, advocates of the model-theoretic conception of theories are committed to ramsification, but in a less obvious way. The model-theoretic conception of scientific theories tends to be associated with a certain subschool of scientific structuralism: "ontic structural realism" or "ontological structuralism" (see Ladyman 1998 , French & Ladyman 2003 , Brading & Landry 2005 . Insofar as I grasp its claims, it appears to rest on two main lines of argument. First, there are certain arguments about indiscernibility in quantum theory and spacetime theory, alleged to have structuralist consequences; second, a preference for the model-theoretic conception of scientific theories. In contrast with the idea that our knowledge is limited to the world's "structure", the slogan is something like "all there is is structure" (Brading & Landry 2004) . This is baffling. The standard conception of structure is the usual one from logic and mathematics: a domain, with some sequence of distinguished relations. So, does "all there is is structure" mean that reality has a domain and a sequence of distinguished relations? Is ontological structuralism the view that:
Reality is a Structure (19) Reality itself is a structure, of the form (W, R 1 ,…, R n )?
If one makes this metaphysical assumption then the Newman objection discussed below does not apply. For, in that case, claiming that a given structure M is "isomorphic to the world" is then the claim that M ≅ (W, R 1 ,…, R n ). This is non-trivial. For example, suppose that reality, at bottom, has two basic distinguished 3-place relations, R 1 and R 2 . Suppose our representing structure M is the usual field (R, +, ×) of real numbers. Then the claim that (R, +, ×) ≅ (W, R 1 , R 2 ) is highly non-trivial. However, if one does not make the "reality is a structure" assumption, the Newman objection does apply, and the structural representation claim "M is isomorphic to the world" is equivalent to "The world has cardinality at least |M|". As things stand, I do not know whether or not advocates of ontological structuralism do or don't make this metaphysical assumption. In contrast, the epistemological school of scientific structuralism tends to maintain that theories be identified with their linguistic formulations, holding the "cognitive content" of a theory Θ, expressed in an interpreted language L, to be given by its Ramsey sentence ℜ(Θ) (see, e.g., Carnap 1956 ). The epistemological claim is that when a theory Θ satisfies certain conditions of epistemic warrant (predictive, explanatory success, etc.), one is justified in accepting that ℜ(Θ) is true, or approximately true. This is meant to implement the vague idea that all we know of reality is its "structure", while its "nature" remains forever hidden. [A]ll we can say is, "There is a relation R such that the structure of the external world with reference to R is M". Now I have already pointed out that such a statement expresses only a trivial property of the world. Any collection of things can be organised so as to have the structure M, provided there are the right number of them. Hence the doctrine that only structure is known involves the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of existence, except ("theoretically") the number of constituting objects. (Newman 1928, p.144; slight change in notation.) So, if all that we know of reality is that it "instantiates" a structure M, then it follows that we know nothing more than a lower bound on the cardinality of reality. The mathematical point is this:
Basic Mathematical Point
The following statements are equivalent: (a) There exists a structure M W on some subset of W such that
Consider again the structural representation claims of the sort associated with the model-theoretic conception of theories: (20a) Minkowski spacetime (R 4 , η ab ) "represents" (or is "isomorphic" to) the world. (20b) The world instantiates, or exemplifies, Minkowski spacetime (R 4 , η ab ).
Newman's objection is that these are equivalent to saying:
(21) The cardinality of the world is at least 2 ℵ 0 .
Thus, whether a class Σ of structures is "true" or not depends merely on the cardinality of the world. For epistemological structuralism, the situation is more complicated. Consider a scientific theory Θ, expressed in an interpreted language L with domain W. Suppose first that all predicates are "ramsified". Then Newman's point tells us that, (22) ℜ(Θ) is true iff Θ has a full model with cardinality |W|. So, the truth of ℜ(Θ) reduces to a satisfiability condition, weaker than Θ's truth. However, perhaps some predicates, the "observational" ones, should not be ramsified. This is the standard approach, associated with Carnap, Maxwell, Worrall and Zahar. Does Newman's objection apply here? The first discussion of this scenario was given in an interesting and very important 1985 article by William Demopoulos and Michael Friedman, who summarize the application of Newman's objection in this case as follows:
[I]f our theory is consistent, and if all its purely observational consequences are true, then the truth of the Ramsey-sentence follows as a theorem of set theory or second-order logic, provided our initial domain has the right cardinality -if it doesn't, then the consistency of our theory again implies the existence of a domain that does. (Demopoulos & Friedman 1985, p.635.) The implications seem to be devastating: (i) Epistemological structuralism reduces to a version of anti-realism (constructive empiricism, instrumentalism, or something similar). (ii) Ontological structuralism reduces to the claim that every scientific theory can be re-expressed as "the world has cardinality at least κ".
The main technical conclusion given by Demopoulos and Friedman -let us call it DF -has been endorsed by several authors in the recent literature on the scientific realism debate (e.g., Psillos 1999) . My intention in Ketland 2004 was to clarify the matter by providing an appropriate framework for formalizing scientific theories and seeing how to prove DF. As it turns out, DF formulated as above is not quite correct: the main block in the proof is a kind of ω-inconsistency (see footnote 10 below for some details). However, with certain modifications to the formulation of DF, one gets closely connected results (see, e.g., Theorems 1, 4 and 5 below). The main result of Ketland 2004, using a 2-sorted formalization of the language of scientific theories, was: 
Empirical Adequacy and the O/T Distinction
Below, we introduce two formalization schemes for scientific theories. The notion of "empirical adequacy" has to be defined somehow. Trying to do this carefully, one notices two notions of observationality at play. First, the notion of observable objects; second, the notion of observational predicates (or relations). In light of this, one might argue that an observational predicate could, in principle, be true of unobservable objects (or could relate observable objects to unobservable ones, or even unobservable objects to unobservable ones). Consider the predicate "part of". Suppose we take "part-of" to be observational. Consider the following three statements: Statement (23a) involves a relation between observable objects; an observable state of affairs. Statement (23b) is mixed: the corresponding state of affairs involves a relation holding between an unobservable objects and an observable one. Statement (23c) concerns a relation holding between unobservable objects. So, does "part of" count as an observational predicate? Must an "observational" predicate apply only to observable objects? If we say No, then the obvious 1-sorted way to formalize scientific theories leads to "observational" statements whose truth value depends upon the properties of unobservable objects. If we say Yes, then one cannot get a theorem of the kind that Demopoulos and Friedman were after unless one uses the 2-sorted formalization used in Ketland 2004. On the 2-sorted approach, we represent (23a)−(23c) as involving three distinct predicates, say "part O ", "part M " and "part T ", depending on the observational status of their relata. So, the empiricist desire to impose an O/T distinction has forced us to "split" the part-of relation into three separate relations.
7 How-7 I described this "relation-splitting" objection to the O/T distinction in talks in 2002 (at LSE and Leeds); in Ketland 2004, I commented: "The technical framework described here … is riddled with further problems … [M]any scientifically significant relations and quantities will 'decompose' into three strangely distinct relations, depending upon the observational status of their relata" (Ketland 2004, p.289, footnotes 3 and 4.) ever, on this 2-sorted approach, the observational predicates do only have observable objects as their relata; and one then obtains a correct DF-style result.
A less metaphysically artificial approach introduces either a distinction in the semantics (by supposing that some special subset Obs of the domain W of the intended interpretation consists of the observable objects) or by explicitly introducing into the theory-formulation language a primitive unary predicate Obs(x) meaning "x is an observable object", and defining the observationla statements by restricting quantifiers to Obs(x). (Cf., in set theory, one can restrict quantifiers to a given set, e.g., ω.) This is, in effect, a 1-sorted formalization, in which the observable objects are explicitly distinguished by some predicate. We shall briefly discuss this approach below, in Section 3. However, one cannot then get a DF-style result, because the relevant notion of "empirical adequacy" is too weak to entail the truth of the Ramsey sentence (see the remarks after Definition E below).
However, the usual approach, associated with Carnap, is to consider a 1-sorted theory-formulation language L with primitive predicates partitioned into "observational" and "theoretical" ones, saying nothing about the observational status of the objects to which these predicates apply. In particular, the domain W of the interpreted language may contain unobservables and the O-predicates are permitted to apply to these. On this approach, one may define a notion of "O-adequacy" and one obtains a DFstyle result, "ℜ(Θ) is true iff Θ is O-adequate". However, the problem is that "O-adequate" doesn't mean what is intended. For the quantifiers of L range over all elements of W, including unobservables. So, certain "observational" statements will be true/false in virtue of facts about unobservable objects.
One-Sorted Formalization
Scientific theories are to be formulated in a one-sorted, second-order, theory formulation language L with identity. Non-logical primitives of L are classified into two kinds: observational predicates, O i , and theoretical predicates, T i . The sublanguage of L from which the theoretical predicates and second-order variables have been deleted is called L's observational sublanguage, denoted L O . An L-theory Θ is a deductively closed set of Lsentences. We may identify a theory Θ with some axiomatization of it; if Θ is finitely axiomatizable, then we may identify Θ with a single formula which is the conjunction of the axioms. Suppose Θ is the single axiom for a finitely axiomatized L-theory. The Ramsey sentence ℜ(Θ) is obtained by replacing, in Θ, each occurrence of a theoretical predicate T i by a secondorder variable X i of the same arity, and prefixing the result with a string of existential quantifiers, one for each variable X i that appears. Thus,
L is given a special partial interpretation (W, {O i }), where W is the domain over which the quantifiers range and the O i are the "observational" relations on W which interpret the observational predicates O i . We suppose that W = Obs ∪ Unobs, where Obs is the set of "observable" objects and Unobs is the set of "unobservable" objects. (Obs and Unobs are assumed disjoint.) As discussed above, we allow "observational" predicates to apply to some unobservable objects. The semantics is standard Tarskian semantics. 
Two-Sorted Formalization
The language L is now a two-sorted, second-order, language with identity. 
EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY AND O-ADEQUACY
As noted above, the relevant notion of empirical adequacy is tricky to formulate on the 1-sorted formalization.
Definition B
The substructure (Obs, {O i | Obs }), generated by the subset Obs, is the empirical substructure of (W, {O i }).
Definition C
Perhaps a better analysis of the notion of empirical adequacy requires an embedding of the empirical substructure into some model of Θ. That is:
Definition E An L-theory Θ is empirically adequate iff Θ has a full model which is empirically correct.
Sadly, Definitions A-E are pointless. For the adequacy conditions on Θ given in Definitions C and E are too weak to imply the truth of ℜ(Θ). As it turns out, if we want DF-style results, we must either move to the 2-sorted formalization or introduce a stronger notion, "O-adequacy": Definition H An L-theory Θ is O-adequate iff Θ has a full, O-correct, model. Next, assume the 2-sorted formalization. This is Theorem 1 in disguise. ℜ(Θ)'s truth condition now involves facts about unobservables. However, information about the purely theoretical relationships amongst unobservables has again been reduced to mere cardinality (encoded into the bijections required for O-M correctness). So, this response achieves little.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
It seems to me that the results above confirm Demopoulos and Friedman's main conclusion that ramsification "trivializes physics" (Demopoulos & Friedman 1985, p.635) ; ramsification leads to what might be called physics without physics. That is, purely structural content just is cardinality content.
11 So far as I can see, if one wishes to avoid such conclusions, one must adopt a form of scientific essentialism or natural kinds realism:
Scientific Essentialism/Natural Kinds Realism Nature has its own special "natural kind" structure; second-order variables only range over the relations that are "natural".
Thus, Ramsey sentences should be understood as follows:
(24) There are natural relations R 1 ,…, R n such that Θ(R 1 ,…, R n ).
However, is scientific essentialism consistent with scientific structuralism? The structuralist, epistemological or ontological, must take the metaphysical notion of "natural relation" as an unreduced primitive in theorizing, and must assume from the outset that reality has a built-in natural kind structure.
